Glenn Anderson v. Sirmons,  2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3753 (10th Cir 2/21/2007)
Two main issues in the opinion are noted.  The broader issue is the responsibility of counsel to do a meaningful job in preparing for the penalty phase mitigation with relief granted on trial counsel’s failure to develop mitigation. For habeas litigators there is a lot there to think about, including a very common sense approach to procedural default and the availability of state post-conviction relief / conflict of interest. More here.

Bigler Stouffer II v. State, 2007 Okla. Crim. App. LEXIS 4 (Okla Crim App 2/22/2007) "Petitioner may not represent himself in this capital post-conviction proceeding, we also hold that appointed counsel's September 15, 2006, motion to withdraw, which was based on the trial court's findings after the hearing on Petitioner's motion to proceed pro se, is denied. We further order that the previous stay of the post-conviction application filing deadline shall be lifted, and counsel shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Order within which to file Appellant's application for post-conviction relief.

People v. Steven Bell,  2007 Cal. LEXIS 1493 (Cal 2/15/2007)
The Court finds error in the trial court's "decision to strike, at the prosecutor's request, a question and answer on cross-examination of a defense expert;" the error, however is harmless. Findlaw notes relief denied upon several other issues, as well as: "1) Wheeler/Batson motions; 2) judicial misconduct involving disparaging remarks about defense counsel; 3) evidence of defendant's lack of remorse during the guilt phase trial; 4) a restriction on expert testimony; 5) the trial court's treatment of a holdout juror; 6) the unconstitutionality of California's death penalty statute; and 7) cumulative prejudice from errors."

People v. Andrew Urdiales,  2007 Ill. LEXIS 437 (Ill 2/16/2007)
On direct appeal, relief denied on claims that: "(1) the trial court erred in ordering defendant restrained during trial, and instructing the jury that "security measures" had been implemented; (2) the trial court's repeated on-the-record criticisms of recent appellate court opinions deprived defendant of due process and fundamental fairness; (3) the trial court denied defendant due process and fundamental fairness when the court disparaged the motives and conduct of attorneys from the Office of the State Appellate Defender; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in rejecting defendant's plea of guilty but mentally ill; (5) the trial court's verdict of guilty, instead of guilty but mentally ill, was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (6) the trial court's statement to the sentencing jury, that the court had rejected defendant's insanity defense at trial, and the prosecutor's reference thereto in closing argument, "improperly demeaned the defendant's mitigating evidence of mental illness, and punished defendant for exercising his constitutional right to present a defense"; (7) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request to submit experts' reports to the jury; (8) the trial court erred in improperly assisting the prosecutor in cross-examining a witness and thus establishing a foundation for a prosecution exhibit; (9) the prosecutor's closing argument denied defendant due process; (10) the sentencing jury should have been specifically instructed that a background of extreme emotional or physical abuse is a mitigating factor; and (11) the Illinois death penalty statute violates principles announced in Apprendi in that it does not require application of the reasonable doubt standard at the second stage of capital sentencing proceedings."

State v. Hoffner, 2007 Ohio 376 (Ohio 2/14/2007)
Petition to reopen appeal denied as "Hoffner waited more than five years before filing his application" and was hence out of time

On February 14, 2007, Judge Jennifer Coffman of the Western District of Kentucky ruled that Parramore Sanborn was entitled to habeas relief on a claim that admission of certain testimony during sentencing proceedings by a prosecution expert violated the Sixth Amendment. Sanborn v. Parker, 2007 WL 495202 (W.D. Ky. 2007). The prosecution expert had been permitted to evaluate Sanborn because he had intended to raise the defense that he committed the murder while under extreme emotional disturbance (“EED”). When the expert first interviewed Sanborn, Sanborn denied even being near the victim when she was killed. In a subsequent interview, Sanborn told the expert that he wanted to clarify what he had said earlier. At this second meeting, Sanborn admitted being with the victim and described the circumstances leading up to the murder. When asked why Sanborn had failed to provide the expert with this account at the initial interview, Sanborn stated that he had intended to but had gone off on something else. The expert then asked whether Sanborn had met with anyone else after the first meeting. Sanborn told her that he had met with one of his attorneys. The expert asked what the trial strategy would be and Sanborn explained that he intended to argue that the murder was committed while he was under emotional distress. At the resentencing hearing, the prosecutor was permitted to elicit testimony from the expert that Sanborn’s story had changed after he met with someone, as well as what Sanborn had said about his trial strategy. Judge Coffman agreed with Sanborn’s contention that the expert’s testimony constituted an unconstitutional governmental interference with his relationship with his attorney. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). "While not necessarily improper when considered independently, [the prosecution expert´s] conjoined questions-about (1) Sanborn´s meeting with his attorney and (2) his defense strategy-were tantamount to her asking what he and his attorney had discussed in that meeting. The unnecessary question about the meeting with counsel was not critical to her assessment of Sanborn´s credibility and was a clear intrusion into the attorney-client relationship." Further, “[b]y eliciting [the expert’s] testimony that Sanborn had altered his statements after talking to ‘someone,’ the prosecution unnecessarily conveyed privileged attorney-client information to the jury, thus prejudicing” Sanborn. Although “Sanborn was not prevented from presenting his EED defense,” nevertheless “an improper interference with his attorney-client relationship substantially undermined his key argument against the imposition of the death penalty.”

Judge Coffman denied the remaining claims. Three of the claims concerned the admission of testimony at the guilt phase retrial by Reverend Barclay Brown, a United Methodist Minister who had initially been retained to serve as a defense expert regarding, among other things, a theological perspective of the death penalty and Sanborn´s religious upbringing. After it was determined that Reverend Brown would not testify, Brown continued to see Sanborn. Sanborn was convicted and sentenced to death. The conviction and death sentence, however, were reversed by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Brown then went to the prosecutor because he was troubled by some of the things that Sanborn had said to him. Ultimately, he was permitted to testify at the guilt phase retrial as a prosecution witness. Judge Coffman found no constitutional error. First, “at least when the relationship began, any expectation that conversations between Sanborn and Brown would remain confidential was unreasonable” given that Brown was expected to be a testifying expert and anything said to him was not confidential. Second, “there was no evidence that Sanborn consulted Brown on spiritual matters.” Third, “[b]ecause [Sanborn’s] conversations with Brown were not subject to protection as integral to the attorney-client relationship, Sanborn´s argument that the government improperly interfered with his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance is unavailing.” Judge Coffman did grant Sanborn a COA on his claims related to Reverend Brown: (1) Whether the admission of Rev. Brown´s testimony violated the attorney-client privilege in contravention of Sanborn´s Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process; (2) Whether the admission of Rev. Brown´s testimony violated the priest-penitent privilege in contravention of Sanborn´s Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process; and (3) Whether the admission of Rev. Brown´s testimony constituted an unconstitutional governmental interference with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.