Pending Executions 
November
5 Khristian Oliver* (Texas)
10 Yosvanis Valle* (Texas)
10 John Allen Muhammad* (Virginia)
17 Gerald Eldridge* (Texas)
17 Larry  Elliott* (Virginia)
18 Danielle Simpson*  (Texas)(V)
19 Robert Thompson* (Texas)

December
2 Cecil Johnson Jr.* (Tenn)
3 Bobby Woods& Texas)
9 Devin Banks (Tenn)

Recent Stays & Reprieves
October    
5 Larry  Elliott* (Virginia)(reprieve until at least mid-November)
9 Lawrence Reynolds, Jr.* (Ohio)
22 Christopher Kennedy (Penn)

November
4  Paul Johnson* (FL)
10 Darryl Durr* (Ohio)

December
8 Kenneth Biros * (Ohio)

Recent Executions
October
8 Max Payne* (Alabama)
20 Mark McClain* (GA)
27 Reginald Blanton* (Texas)
* "serious" execution date / (s) stay believed likely / (V) Volunteer / note this list may exclude any recently added execution date
(note that none of the Pennsylvania dates listed are likely actual execution dates)

• Joseph Corcoran v. Levenhagen,   2009 U.S. LEXIS 7479 (10/20/2009) "Seventh Circuit erred in reversing a grant of habeas relief to a death row inmate on one claim without addressing the other claims and directing a denial of the writ on remand, thus, the judgment was vacated and remanded for the Seventh Circuit to explain why such consideration was unnecessary or allow the district court to address those claims." [via LexisOne]

• Cory Maples v. Allen, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23580 (11th Cir 10/26/2009) (dissent) Relief denied on claims relating to whether "(1) Maples’s ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally defaulted because Maples did not timely file an appeal of the dismissal of his Rule 32 petition; (2) even if Maples’s default were the result of his three post-conviction counsel’s failing to file a Rule 32 appeal, such ineffectiveness could not establish cause for the default because there is no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel; and (3) the Alabama appellate courts’ decisions that Maples was not entitled to a sua sponte jury instruction on manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law." Dissent argues the procedural bar at issue is not “firmly established and regularly followed.”

• State v. Gerald Bordelon,  2009 La. LEXIS 2968 (La. 10/16/09) "[W]e have granted defendant's motion to waive his direct appeal, and because our Rule 28 review reveals that the death penalty imposed on defendant is not excessive, the appeal of his conviction for first degree murder and sentence of death is hereby dismissed."

• Kim McMichen v. Hall,  2009 Ga. LEXIS 640 (GA 10/19/2009) "[T]he habeas court was correct to deny McMichen relief based on his argument that his trial was unfair because he was denied funds to hire expert witnesses.. . . [T]he denial of the experts did not affect the outcome of the trial. However, the state Supreme Court has determined that the habeas court failed to address another issue: whether the prosecution presented perjured testimony through a jailhouse snitch. At trial, Gibson Williams said he‟d not been promised anything by the State in return for his testimony against McMichen. But at the habeas hearing, Williams said the opposite. “This Court could affirm despite this omission by the habeas court if we could conclude that, even assuming the prosecution knowingly presented false testimony, there is no „reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury,‟” the 26-page opinion says about the lower court‟s failure to address the claim. “However, we cannot reach that conclusion.” A jury considering whether to sentence someone to life or death 'may decline to impose a death sentence for any reason or no reason at all.” Therefore, the state Supreme Court has vacated the habeas court‟s denial of McMichen‟s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, “and the case is remanded for explicit findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the allegedly-false trial testimony of Gibson Williams and for a new ruling on whether McMichen is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.'" 
  

• Anthony Doss v. State,  2009 Miss. LEXIS 510 (Miss 10/22/2009) "Doss asserts that defense counsel [ ] failed to properly investigate the available mitigating evidence and presented only one witness in mitigation at the penalty phase. retardation.  If Doss' trial counsel had reviewed the records provided by the public defender's office in Shelby County and had followed up with potential witnesses, he would have  uncovered mitigating evidence almost identical to that in Rompilla."
  

• Paul Ezra Rhoades v. State,  2009 Ida. LEXIS 187 (Ida 10/19/2009) Relief denied on "A. Whether the district court correctly denied Rhoades's motion to amend his petition for post-conviction relief to add a count alleging a Brady violation under Idaho Code 19-2719." and "B. Whether the district court correctly denied Rhoades's motion to amend his petition to add an "actual-innocence" count under Idaho Code  19-2719."

• Paul Ezra Rhoades v. State , No. 35021 (Ida 10/19/2009) "Three main issues are presented on appeal: First, whether the grounds raised by Rhoades allow for equitable tolling of the limitation provided by I.C. § 19-4902; second, for grounds that would entitle him to equitable tolling, whether Rhoades has met his burden of pleading facts that would entitle him to that equitable tolling; and finally, whether this appeal was frivolous and whether, as a result, the state is entitled to an award of attorney fees.
  

• State v. Shedrab Williams,  2009 La. LEXIS 2973 (LA 10/20/2009) "[T]he primary issue at the guilt phase of trial, as well as the penalty phase of trial, was defendant's 'mental capacity' at the time of the offense. Defendant changed his plea to not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and therefore sought to prove at trial that he was legally insane at the time he killed [the victims]. What transpired at the guilt phase, however, was not simply testimony as to whether or not defendant was insane at the time of the offense, but also what diminished mental capacity he may have been experiencing at the time of the offense and whether he is mentally retarded, issues more properly presented to the jury in the penalty phase of the trial. However, neither party made any objection to taking the testimony of the expert witnesses for the defense and the state in this manner, i.e., entirely within the guilt phase of trial. Indeed, it was the defense that introduced defendant's expert's testimony at the guilt phase as to insanity, diminished capacity, and mental retardation. Though these issues were all addressed contemporaneously by counsel and the witnesses during the  taking of the testimony, we point out that the jury was clearly and properly charged by the district court as to the distinct issues it was to determine at the guilt phase (insanity) and at the penalty phase (mental retardation and mitigating circumstances). Therefore, as discussed more fully below, we do not find the jurors were confused on the issues or the evidence before them. At any rate, with the understanding that the testimony of the defendant's expert encompassed insanity, mental retardation, diminished capacity, and mitigation, we will address the assignments of error concerning the not guilty by reason of insanity defense and the mental retardation defense in that order."
  

• John Steven Gardner v. State, 2009 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1441 (Tex Crim App 10/21/2009) " Defendant argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. The court of criminal appeals disagreed. The evidence showed that defendant drove to the victim's isolated rural home, used his extra key to open the front door, walked down to the bedroom to confront the victim sitting up in bed, shot her through the right temple, took the house keys from her purse hanging on the bedpost, locked the front door as he left, put the victim's keys into the tool box in the victim's truck, stopped at a ditch two to three miles down the road (perhaps to throw his extra set of keys into the ditch), and then drove back to Mississippi. The victim, meanwhile, was still conscious enough to put on her robe, which was hanging on the bedpost, look outside to see defendant departing in the white truck with Mississippi plates, and then call 911 to summon an ambulance. The evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to prove that defendant murdered the victim while in the course of committing burglary." [via LexisOne]

• Cerron Thomas Hooks v. Branker, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 23374 (4th Cir 10/23/2009) (unpublished) Relief denied on claims relating to whether a key witness's "recantation [ ] renders him innocent of the death penalty;"  ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to adequately cross examine key state's witnesses; and "North Carolina's 'especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel' aggravating factor and the jury instruction that the trial judge gave on it were unconstitutionally vague and failed to limit the jury's discretion."
  

• Jomekia Dechelle Pope v. State, 2009 Ga. LEXIS 628 (GA 10/19/2009) "[T]he Georgia Supreme Court has concluded 'that the trial court erred by unjustifiably ordering Pope to undergo a psychological examination.' The high court has also ruled that the lower court was wrong to throw out the felony murder charge against Pope. And it reminds the trial court that the admission of hearsay statements made by the alleged victim to an officer about a previous alleged incident of domestic violence would violate Pope‟s constitutional right to confrontation if he objects, because the statements were made when there was no longer an ongoing emergency."